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Abstract 
This article
1
 will critically interrogate the relationship between Human Security and 
Ontological Security from a broadly post-colonial perspective. For Anthony Giddens to be 
„ontologically secure is to possess… “answers” to fundamental existential questions which all 
human life in some way addresses‟(Giddens 1991:47). Religion and nationalism provide 
„answers‟ to these questions in times of rapid socio-economic and cultural change (Kinvall 
2004). The dislocation engendered by successive waves of neo-liberal globalization has 
resulted in the deracination of many of the world‟s inhabitants resulting in a state of 
collective „existential anxiety‟ (Giddens 1991).  Under such conditions, the search for 
ontological security becomes paramount. However, conventional understandings of Human 
Security as „freedom from fear and want‟ are unable, from a post-colonial perspective- to 
provide the individual with ontological security since they operate with a culturally specific, 
Eurocentric understanding of the „human‟ as „bare life‟ (Agamben 1998). It will then be 
argued that post-secular conceptions of Human Security (Shani 2014) by acknowledging the 
role which culture and religion can play in providing answers to existential questions 
concerning the „basic parameters of human life‟ are better able to „protect‟ the ontological 
security of the individual in times of rapid global transformation in the post-colonial world 
given the centrality of religion to post-colonial subjectivity. This will be illustrated by the 
case of the global Sikh community. It will be argued that ontological, and therefore, Human 
Security rests on reintegrating the „secular‟ and „temporal‟ dimensions of Sikhi which had 
been severed as a result of the colonial encounter.  
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Introduction 
 
The decision of the British people to reject continued membership in the European Union on 
June 23
rd
 2016 may be viewed as the latest nail in the coffin of the great elite-led neoliberal 
project of „globalization‟.  In truth, the age of globalization ended over a decade ago2 with the 
twin „black Septembers‟ of 2001 (hereafter 9.11) and 2008 (hereafter the global financial 
crisis) shaking confidence in the liberal project of secular modernity and an emerging „market 
civilization.‟3 Globalization4 as a project sought to make the world safe for capitalism by 
constructing „global‟ subjects. Rational, self-interested and autonomous, these resilient 
individuals would be able to look to themselves and not the state for security. It provided the 
leitmotif for a „runaway world‟5 marked by transformation rather than continuity. 
Security in the pre-global era was characterized by narratives of belonging to 
territorially-defined political communities. States provided not only physical (and in some 
cases material) security but also ontological security. Ontological security, according to 
Anthony Giddens, refers to a „person‟s fundamental sense of safety in the world and includes 
a basic trust of other people. Obtaining such trust becomes necessary for a person to maintain 
a sense of psychological well-being and avoid existential anxiety.‟6 Globalization, however, 
challenged our very understanding of „inside/outside‟7 by bringing the state and its monopoly 
of the use of legitimate violence over a given territory
8
 into question. Many saw globalization 
to have ushered in a global civil society existing alongside a society of states characterized by 
the commitment to liberal values.  The spread of liberal democratic institutions, a renewed 
commitment by both intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations to humanitarian 
activism and intervention, and growing trends towards regional integration within the EU led 
some to liken this nascent global civil society with  Kant‟s idea of „a universal civil society.‟9  
The events of 9.11 and the ensuing „War on Terror‟ however, exposed this as a myth 
while exposing the impotence of the state to physically protect its citizens from transnational 
threats. Furthermore, as the global financial crisis of 2008 suggested, the state is not able to 
protect its citizens from the disruptions to everyday lives experienced as a result of 
integration within a global market. Nor, with the concomitant waves of legal and illegal 
migration, mainly from those areas of the postcolonial world deemed „surplus‟ to the 
demands of global capital, can the state continue to define the political community in 
predominately national or ethnic terms. This is acutely felt in the European Union where the 
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free movement of labour within the region is guaranteed by Article 45 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union
10
. The challenge posed to narratives of belonging based 
on „primordial attachments‟11 to an ethnically-defined national community is exacerbated by 
the possibility of the EU absorbing more migrants from the conflict-ridden areas of the 
Middle-East and North Africa (MENA) region.  The spectre of a concomitant „clash of 
civilizations‟ 12  continues to haunt Europe in the light of periodic attacks upon it by 
„homegrown terrorists‟ from its migrant communities.  
In such circumstances, „Brexit‟ may not be considered a shock but is symptomatic of 
a retreat from the (neo)liberal project of globalization, exemplified in Europe by the rise of 
populist, autochthonous, anti-migrant political parties.
13
 In the United States, this is mirrored 
by the election of President Donald Trump, a populist who favours unilateralism and tight 
immigration controls, and opposes the North America Free Trade Area (NAFTA), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the right of people from seven Muslim majority states from 
even visiting the United States. What we appear to be witnessing in the West is not only a 
retreat from globalization but a rejection of cosmopolitan conceptions of Human Security
14
 in 
favour of the search for communitarian narratives of ontological security in the reassertion of 
„national‟ sovereignty and civilizational identities. 
 
Argument and Structure 
 
This article will account for the failure of conventional understandings of Human Security to 
provide ontological security in our „global age,‟ from a broadly post-colonial perspective. By 
Human Security, I mean the right of people to live in freedom and dignity, free from fear and 
want. Ontological security, at its most basic, refers to the psychological security of the self. 
The argument is therefore that the right of people to live in freedom and dignity is based on 
the prior existence of a stable self which is able to engage and interact with others. If 
individuals lack ontological security, they are unable to establish relations of basic trust with 
other individuals and, consequently, are unlikely to be able to live in freedom and dignity, 
free from fear and want. Human Security, therefore, presupposes ontological security. 
However, ontological security does not necessarily entail Human Security.  Individuals may 
find ontological security by belonging to communities which deny the right of others to 
freedom or dignity, whether on the grounds of culture, gender, sexuality, race or religion.  
Ontological security may, therefore, be found in reinforcing or strengthening the boundary 
between „self‟ and „other‟ or „friend‟ and „enemy.‟15 Human Security, however, attempts to 
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transcend this boundary by positing the universal category of the „human,‟ which 
encompasses both „self‟ and „other,‟ as the primary referent of security. Human Security, 
therefore, attempts to ensure security for individuals without recourse to the „friend-enemy‟ 
dichotomy. By postcolonial, I refer to any approach
16
 which places emphasis on the 
formative impact of colonialism in the constitution of the present. A post-colonial approach 
to Human Security would bring into question the central assumptions upon which it is based 
by historicizing the abstract concept of the „human‟ and questioning  „universal‟ aspirations 
to „freedom‟ and „dignity‟ which, it is argued, are deeply implicated in colonial regimes of 
power through the imposition of  Eurocentric „standards of civilization‟ 17 during the Age of 
Empire
18
.  
The emergence of Human Security as a response to the globalization of neo-liberalism 
will first be critically interrogated. The dislocation engendered by successive waves of neo-
liberal globalization has led to the deracination of many of the world‟s inhabitants resulting in 
a state of collective existential anxiety.
19
 Under such conditions of existential anxiety, the 
search for identity and community becomes paramount. However, „secular‟ conceptions of 
Human Security as „freedom from fear and want‟20  fail to take into account ontological 
security. Instead, the focus is on protection and empowerment. From a postcolonial 
perspective, it is argued that Human Security can be seen as the latest instalment of the 
„civilising mission‟ of nineteenth century imperialism in that it seeks to universalize a 
Eurocentric conception of the „human‟ as a rational, autonomous agent. The Enlightenment 
understanding of the human as an individual to be protected and empowered, furthermore, 
has a genealogy in the Judeo-Christian, and specifically Protestant,  tradition which brings 
into question its claims to be „secular‟. It will then be suggested that, given this historical 
baggage, a „post-secular‟21 understanding of Human Security which recognizes a multiplicity 
of different culturally embedded understandings of the „human‟ and „security‟ without 
prioritizing any one conception may potentially offer a more productive engagement with 
ontological security in times of rapid global transformation in the post-colonial world given 
the centrality of religion to post-colonial subjectivity.  
This will be illustrated by the case of the global Sikh community. It is argued that 
both territorialized narratives of Sikh nationalism
22
, as exemplified by the movement for an 
independent Sikh state, Khalistan, and deterritorialized narratives of Sikhism as a „world 
religion‟23 may be considered  quests for ontological security in a rapidly changing world yet 
both are unable to provide human security. For Giddens, to be „ontologically secure is to 
possess, on the level of the unconscious and practical consciousness, “answers” to 
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fundamental existential questions which all human life in some way addresses.‟ Religion and 
nationalism, as Catarina Kinvall has pointed out, attempt to provide „answers‟ to these 
questions in times of rapid socio-economic and cultural change.
24
 Both religion and 
nationalism, however, are „derivative discourses‟25 of colonial modernity and, as such, it is 
argued that they cannot provide stability and coherence to the fractured post-colonial self. 
26
  
Consequently, they are unable to provide ontological security or human security in the „post-
secular‟ sense outlined above. Colonialism led to a thinning out of indigenous cosmological 
traditions and their reduction to an instrumentalized politics of identity. In the case of the 
Sikh cosmological tradition, the „sacred‟ (miri) and the „profane‟ (piri) are intertwined in the 
idea of Sikhi. This is encapsulated in the symbol Ik Ōankār which literally means „One, 
whose expression emerges as Word‟.27 Colonialism led to the division of Sikhi into „sacred‟ 
and „temporal‟ domains; Sikhism became a „religion‟ and the Sikhs became an ethno-national 
group. This splitting of the „secular‟ and „temporal‟ aspects of Sikhi as exemplified in the 
Khalsa Panth may be seen as a cause of ontological insecurity for many Sikhs
28
 Although the 
Khalsa maintains a clear embodied boundary between „inside‟ and „outside,‟ 29  the 
commitment to a universality which recognizes difference in Sikhi transcends the „friend-
enemy‟ dichotomy and may, for Sikhs, be a source of human as well as ontological security. 
This understanding of human security,
30
 however, is not based on the abstract universalism of 
conventional notions of Human Security but the security which comes from being part of a 
community where „faith‟ is part of the lived experience of individuals rather than a 
secularized marker of communal identity. 
 
Human Security: A Post-colonial Critique 
 
The concept of Human Security was introduced to an audience of policy-makers through the 
publication of the United Nations Development Program Human Development Report in 
1994. It was in part motivated by an attempt to tackle the „downside risks‟ caused by neo-
liberal globalization. Indeed, Human Security in its early days challenged not only the 
hegemony of the antiquated „national security paradigm‟ which continues to dominate the 
theory and practice of International Relations (IR) to this day but also the material and 
ontological insecurities wrought by the „Washington Consensus‟: the globalization of neo-
liberalism. Human Security was defined as „safety from chronic threats such as hunger, 
disease and repression‟ and as „protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in patterns of 
daily life – whether in jobs, in homes or in communities.‟ 31  The implications for our 
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understanding of security were manifold. In the first place, the referent object of security 
discourse was no longer the state but the individual; the state‟s claim to legitimacy lay in its 
„responsibility to protect‟ the individual. Secondly, security threats were no longer seen as 
emanating from outside the state but also from inside. They existed transnationally and on a 
global scale. Thirdly, hunger and disease – the eradication of which had traditionally been 
seen as part of the „human condition‟ which could only be alleviated through „development‟, 
the adoption of modern techniques of social, economic and political organization- were 
effectively „securitized‟; their elimination an urgent priority for states and, by implication, the 
emerging „international community‟. Fourthly, safety from „repression‟ opened up the 
possibility that the state, which was supposed to protect individuals from external threats, 
could itself be an agent-indeed, the principal agent, judging by a cursory history of the 
twentieth century- of human insecurity. Lastly, but most importantly for the following 
discussion, individuals should be protected from „sudden and hurtful disruptions to patterns 
of everyday life‟ caused by participation in a rapidly globalizing capitalist world economy. 
This opens up the possibility of reconceptualizing security to take into account the insecurity 
felt by individuals who may or may not suffer material deprivations from participation in a 
global market economy.   
 Initially, the UNDP report failed to make inroads into security studies which 
continues to be dominated by advocates of national security but the adoption of Human 
Security by the United Nations General Assembly in September 2012
32
 and its 
institutionalization through the United Nations system through the Trust Fund for Human 
Security, suggests that, prior to the events of 2016, Human Security had become part of the 
global mainstream, a central plank of the post- Cold War „liberal peace.‟33  
Simply put, the notion of Human Security is premised on the assumption that the 
individual human being is the only irreducible focus for discourse on security. Consequently, 
the claims of all other referents, including the nation-state, derive from the sovereignty of the 
individual.
34
 State security, therefore, is based on human security; its legitimacy is based 
upon its ability to protect the individual. While most advocates of Human Security agree on 
the referent object of security discourse, they differ as to what the individual should be 
protected from. Conventionally a distinction is made between „narrow‟ and „broad‟ 
approaches.  Whilst the advocates of the narrow approach prefer to ground Human Security 
in terms of „negative liberty,‟ 35  the resolution adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (A/66/290) in September 2012 goes beyond a narrow focus on the responsibility of 
States to protect their citizens and appears to repudiate the use of force as a means of 
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protecting the individual from „violent threats‟. Human Security is understood as „the right of 
people to live in freedom and dignity, free from poverty and despair‟. „All individuals, in 
particular vulnerable people,‟ the resolution continues, are entitled to freedom from fear and 
freedom from want, with an equal opportunity to enjoy all their rights and fully develop their 
human potential.‟36 This „broader‟ definition bears the imprint of the UNDP report and the 
subsequent attempt by the Commission on Human Security (CHS) to provide a more 
„positive‟ definition of human security. Human Security, according to the Final Report of the 
CHS, is seen as encompassing the „vital core‟ of all human lives: a set of „elementary rights 
and freedoms people enjoy‟ and consider to be „vital‟ to their wellbeing.37   
Human Security, notwithstanding its propensity to work within the prevailing post-
colonial international order of territorialized nation states, shares with Critical Security 
Studies (CSS), an understanding of security as emancipation. For Ken Booth, „emancipation‟ 
denotes the „freeing of people (as individuals and groups) from the physical and human 
constraints which stop them carrying out what they would freely choose to do‟. Emancipation, 
CSS scholars following Ken Booth argue, „not power or order, produces true security‟. 
Therefore, „emancipation, theoretically, is security.‟38 Indeed, Edward Newman has argued 
that Critical Human Security Studies (CHSS) should adopt the approach pioneered by Critical 
Security Studies (CSS) and focus on the emancipation of individuals.
39
 However, it is argued 
that this approach, from a broader post-colonial perspective, reproduces the Eurocentrism of 
much of Human Security discourse. First, Human Security, in either its conventional or 
critical instantiation, assumes that the individual is the primary and the only possible referent 
object of security discourse. Like CSS, Human Security seeks to „denaturalize and historicize 
all human-made, political referents, recognising only the primordial entity of the socially 
embedded individual.‟40 However, the primordiality of the individual as a political referent is 
assumed and the genealogy of the liberal conception of the abstract individual, with which 
political theory is so enamoured,
41
 in the Enlightenment remains unaccounted for. The 
Enlightenment constituted a break within the Western epistemological tradition, renouncing 
„the “strong” cosmological or salvation-oriented assumptions of the classical and religious 
theories of natural law‟ in favour of secular reason which, according to Habermas, serves as 
the „ultimate‟ basis of the legitimization of a state authority 42  and, therefore, of an 
international society composed of sovereign states. However, it also preserved what Walter 
Mignolo has termed the „epistemic privilege‟ of Christianity.  As Mignolo points out, „it was 
from a Christian standpoint and perspective (i.e., the combination of epistemic principles and 
political interests) that the world was ordered and classified‟. Thus, „even when, during the 
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European Enlightenment, a secular epistemology replaced a Christian one and the authority 
of reason replaced the authority of God, the epistemic privilege was maintained.‟ 43 Human 
Security, in reproducing the Enlightenment view of the „human‟ as an autonomous, 
individual actor, retains the epistemic privilege of Christianity within it. The „human‟ of 
Human Security, in other words, may be unintelligible to other (non-Western) cosmological 
traditions
44
 given its implicit Judeo-Christian origins.  
Second, there are unmistakable continuities with the „civilizing mission‟ of nineteenth 
century Imperialism which sought to actively impose a „cultural conversion of non-Western 
states to a Western civilizational standard.‟45 The agents of the contemporary „civilizing 
mission‟, however, are no longer European empires, private companies such as the East India 
Company or missionaries, but an „international community‟ centred on the United Nations 
system dominated by powerful Western states (most of which were colonial Empires) 
working in tandem with multinational corporations and selected international non-
governmental organizations to institutionalize liberal peacebuilding in „fragile‟ post-colonial 
states. They continue to speak to, for, and on behalf of, the „subaltern‟ who are reduced to 
silence even when they engage with the „local.‟46 As Oliver Richmond has observed, the 
„emancipatory‟ approach to Human Security, associated with non-governmental 
organizations operating in the Global South at a grassroots level, aims to „empower 
individuals and remove unnecessary restrictions‟ over their lives to enable autonomous 
agency.
47
 However, it too, has been „unable to transcend its liberal and neoliberal straitjacket‟ 
since it has failed to engage with the „local‟ target population in its own terms and thus build 
„legitimate‟ institutions. 48 
 
From Human to Ontological Security? 
 
Richmond instead advocates a post-liberal human security which would build on existing 
institutional capacities and processes but would be sensitized to „local alterity, resistance and 
accommodation, norms, customs, culture and identity, and an international social contract as 
the basis for Human Security and peacebuilding.‟49 Human Security, thus, becomes a site of 
contestation between the „local‟ and the „liberal‟. This opens up the possibility of the 
emergence of a „post-colonial‟ from of Human Security „capable of organizing hybrid 
understandings of security in relation to the human subjects they produce and are constituted 
by rather than falling back on the often empty securitization of western forms of liberalism 
and realism.‟50  
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However, Richmond appears to reify the „local‟ without taking into account how 
processes of neo-colonial governmentality construct the local as a space distinct from the 
„global‟ or „international.‟ This makes a distinction between the „local‟ and the „liberal‟ 
problematic. Indeed, „liberal Human Security itself may be understood as a „local‟ form of 
secularized ethics particular to Western Europe. By engaging with other culturally embedded 
notions of security, „liberal‟ Human Security may allow us to engage with other forms of the 
„local.‟ But once its aspirations are universalized through the language of protection and 
empowerment by the „international community‟, it silences other culturally mediated 
understandings of Human Security which are no less „universal‟ and resonate with „everyday 
life,‟ particularly in the global South.  
Instead, it is suggested here that a „post-colonial‟ approach to Human Security may 
benefit from dialogic engagement with post-secular thought, notwithstanding the Eurocentric 
assumptions upon which conventional understandings of post-secularism are based  For 
Jürgen Habermas, the term „post-secular‟ refers to societies where the continued existence of 
religious communities in an increasingly secularized environment necessitates, on the one 
hand, the inclusion of religious-based world-views into the public sphere, and, on the other, 
the translation of religious-based claims into secular terms in order to guarantee the 
neutrality of the public sphere. Since the constitutional state is only able to guarantee its 
citizens equal freedom on the basis of mutual recognition as members of a single political 
community, all norms that can be legally implemented must be formulated and publicly 
justified in a language that all the citizens understand. Religious claims should, according to 
Habermas, be permissible in the public sphere but barred entry into the „institutionalized 
decision-making process‟ in order to guarantee the principle of neutrality of the state towards 
competing worldviews. Political decisions, therefore, need to be formulated and be justifiable 
in a language intelligible to all citizens.
51
  
However, the translation of faith-based claims into secular terms requires not only 
that they be „privatized‟ but rendered intelligible to a specific „religious‟ tradition. As Talal 
Asad has persuasively argued, there can be no transhistorical understanding of religion.
52
 
Asad sees the emergence of „religion‟ as inextricably linked to developments within 
Christianity and particularly its relationship with political power. Its genealogy in the Judaeo-
Christian tradition poses problems for the entry of minority religious and/or cultural traditions 
into the public sphere, blurring the distinction between „religious‟ and „secular‟ claims. 
Secularism, as Asad
53
 and José Casanova
54
 among others have pointed out, can only be 
understood with reference to „religion‟. The „secular‟ at one time was „part of a theological 
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discourse (saeculum)‟ denoting the transition from a monastic life to the life of canons.  After 
the Reformation, it signified the „privatization‟ of Church property, that is, its transfer to 
laypersons and entry into market circulation. Finally, in the „discourse of modernity, the 
“secular” presents itself as the ground from which theological discourse was generated…and 
from which it gradually emancipated itself in the mark to freedom.‟55 Consequently, the 
secularization of religious claims may require their insertion into an onto-theological 
framework which may be alien to the adherents of a particular „faith‟.  
It is suggested here that, instead of translating faith-based claims into a secular 
language, an attempt should be made to understand these claims in their own terms. 
Sensitized to cultural difference, a post-secular understanding of human security should 
permit the articulation of multiple claims deriving from different religio-cultural traditions 
without prioritizing any one „tradition‟ as having a monopoly over defining security. 56 
Implicit in this argument, is the assumption that culture and religion may act as important 
forms of ontological security for the individual. This is not to suggest that culture and 
religion can automatically provide security for individuals through mere adherence to 
religious doctrine or routinized practices which may correspond to „tradition‟57 but that they 
are resources that individuals can draw upon in times of rapid social and economic change. If, 
to paraphrase Marx
58
, individuals make their own identities but not under conditions of their 
own choosing, culture and religion may act as both preconditions for, and constraints on, the 
exercise of agency. They can act as preconditions for the exercise of agency by providing a 
stable cognitive environment for the individual to interact with others and establish relations 
based on shared values or an ethical code which may transcend what Charles Taylor refers to 
as the „immanent frame‟59. Equally, culture and religion can act as constraints on the exercise 
of agency by restricting the scope for interaction with others whose values are articulated in 
different conceptual languages. This restricts the range of resources which individuals can 
draw upon when confronted by challenges which threaten established patterns of behaviour 
or even the existence of the self.  
Ontological security may be understood, following Jennifer Mitzen, as „the security of 
the self.‟60 A psychoanalytic term, the concept was introduced by R.D. Laing in his book The 
Divided Self (1960). For Laing, to be ontologically secure is to „have a sense of …presence in 
the world as a real, alive, whole, and, in a temporal sense, a continuous person.‟61 Ontological 
security allows the individual to „encounter all the hazards of life‟ from a „centrally firm 
sense‟ of his or her „own and other people‟s reality and identity.‟ Without ontological 
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security, the individual will be overwhelmed by anxieties that reach to the very roots of the 
individual‟s coherent sense of „being in the world.‟62  
 Laing identifies three forms of anxiety which threaten ontological security: 
engulfment, implosion and petrification.
63
 Engulfment refers to the sense of the loss of 
identity and autonomy which an ontologically insecure individual experiences relating to 
others. Isolation is the preferred strategy used to preserve the individual‟s identity from 
engulfment.
64
  Implosion, on the other hand, refers to the „terror‟ felt by the individual as s/he 
experiences „the world as liable at any moment to crash in and obliterate all identity, as a gas 
will rush in and obliterate a vacuum.‟65 The individual is defined by the emptiness s/he feels 
and „reality‟ is experienced as implosive. Finally, petrification refers to a particular form of 
terror experienced whereby the individual is „petrified,‟ in the sense of being rendered an „it 
without subjectivity.‟ 66  Depersonalization is the common strategy used to deal with the 
„intrusive‟ other. The act of turning the other into a „thing‟ is, for the self, petrifying.  Any 
other is a threat to the self by their very existence, rather than what they may or may not do.
67
  
 An ontologically secure individual is able to act autonomously because s/he has a 
stable sense of self and a „biographical continuity‟ 68  which allows her or him to act 
consistently with regard to future relationships and experiences. Ontologically secure 
individuals are able to exercise agency because of the existence of a „protective cocoon‟ 
which shields them from the many threats to their physical or psychological integrity.
69
 
Giddens had argued that basic trust is a „protective cocoon which all normal individuals carry 
around with them as the means whereby they are able to get on with the affairs of day-to-day 
life.‟70  This protective cocoon is a precondition for „creativity‟: „the capability to act or think 
innovatively in relation to pre-established modes of activity.‟ 71  Ontological security, for 
Giddens, resides in the possession of „“answers” to fundamental existential questions which 
all human life in some way addresses.
72
 These existential questions „concern the basic 
parameters of human life‟, and presume the following ontological and epistemological 
elements: 
 
 Existence and being: the nature of existence, the identity of objects and events. 
 Finitude and human life: the existential contradiction by means of which human 
beings are of nature yet set apart from it as sentient and reflexive creatures. 
 The experience of others: how individuals interpret the traits and actions of other 
individuals. 
12 
 
 The continuity of self-identity: the persistence of feelings of personhood in a 
continuous self and body.
73
  
Religious cosmologies, Giddens acknowledges, may provide answers to these questions by 
providing the biographical continuity necessary for the development of a stable self-identity. 
They provide us with a sense of who we are, who we have become, and where we are going 
by developing conceptions of the afterlife or cycles of rebirth which allow us to cope with the 
spectre of our own finitude. Giddens argues that „in virtually all rationalised religious systems, 
explicit ontological conceptions are found.‟74   
 However, the colonial legacy continues to cast a shadow on the quest for ontological 
security in the postcolonial world as will be discussed below with reference to South Asia. 
Colonization re-articulated local cosmological identities into „global‟ narratives of „religion‟ 
and „nation‟ which became resources upon which post-colonial peoples could draw in their 
search for ontological security.  Identities, following the Lacanian psychoanalytical tradition, 
come from the outside through a process of identification. Jacques Lacan (1977) argued that 
they are inherently „fictional‟ constructs: all identities are „imaginary‟ based on the 
fundamental misrecognition (méconnaisance) of the child with its imago.
75
 The ontological 
insecurity felt by many post-colonial subjects results from this misrecognition with 
Eurocentric categories causing a split in the „self.‟ This is best illustrated in the work of 
Frantz Fanon, a contemporary of Lacan. In Black Skins, White Masks (1952), Fanon, 
accounted for the fragmentation experienced by racialized, colonial subjects forced to put on 
„white masks‟ in order to integrate into a world not of their making. The promise of 
acceptance into white, colonial society elicits a desire to assimilate but is continually deferred 
leading to a profound sense of humiliation, anxiety and (ontological) insecurity. „The 
colonized‟, in Fanon‟s words, is „elevated above his jungle status in proportion to his 
adoption of the mother country‟s cultural standards‟ yet is unable to be accepted due to 
her/his „black skins.‟ 76  Consequently, the racialized (post) colonial subject is, in Homi 
Bhabha‟s words, „almost the same but not quite.‟77  However, in many parts of the post-
colonial world, this fragmentation of the „self‟ is not necessarily expressed in terms of 
inferiority but difference from the West.
78
 The West, however, continues to profoundly 
influence the psychic structures of postcolonial subjectivity even when it appears absent, 
representing an idealized „mirror‟ through which post-colonial subjectivity is (mistakenly) 
constituted. 
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‘Thick’ and ‘Thin’: The Colonial Construction of ‘Religion’  
 
The concept of „religion‟ (as opposed to religio-cultural traditions) in the post-colonial world 
was an imported cultural category imposed upon indigenous societies by the colonizing 
power as part of a regime of colonial governmentality. For Foucault, governmentality 
referred to the: (1) „the ensemble formed by institutions, procedures, analyses and 
reflections…which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political 
economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security‟;  (2) „the tendency 
which, over a long period and throughout the West, has steadily led towards the pre-eminence 
of over all other forms (sovereignty, discipline etc.) of the type of power which may be 
termed „government‟, resulting, on the one hand, in the formation of a whole series of 
specific governmental apparatuses (appareils), and, on the other, in the development of a 
whole complex of knowledges (saviors);‟ and (3) finally, the process, or rather the result of 
the process, through which the state of justice of the Middle Ages, transformed into the 
administrative state during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, gradually becoming 
„governmentalized.‟79 However, as Partha Chatterjee has pointed out, there were significant 
differences between governmentality as it developed in Europe and the governmentality 
which emerged in the colonies. While „governmentality‟ in Britain treated the „population‟ as 
a homogenous, undifferentiated mass of individuals, „colonial governmentality‟ recognized 
and built upon seemingly „primordial‟ categories of „race‟ and „religion‟ through the 
introduction of censuses, separate electorates and employment opportunities for ethno-
religious „communities.‟80  
  The colonial state facilitated the imagination of collective indigenous identities, 
including the Indian nation, through the introduction of modern scientific techniques of 
classification and enumeration that transformed the political landscape of South Asia and 
continue to shape its politics today. The introduction of the Censuses in particular 
transformed previously „fuzzy‟ into „enumerated‟ communities.81  As Bernard Cohn points 
out, „what was entailed in the construction of census operations was the creation of social 
categories by which India was ordered for administrative purposes.‟82 The Census objectified 
religious, social and cultural difference. The categories of caste and religion were seen as 
homogenous and mutually exclusive- it was deemed as irrational for someone to claim to be 
both from the Kshatriya and Vaishya caste as to profess Sikhism and Hinduism as one‟s 
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religious affiliation despite the „fuzziness‟ of caste and religious boundaries in the colonial 
Punjab. Furthermore, the colonial state facilitated the enumeration of these communities 
through the inauguration of a process of statistical counting and spatial mapping. 
Enumeration facilitated the transformation of local caste or ethno-religious into national 
political communities. As local communities were mapped by the Census, the terms „Hindu‟ 
and „Muslim‟ became markers of distinct, homogenous and potentially conflictual political 
identities at an all-India level through the formation of the Muslim League and the Hindu 
Mahasabha.  
 Colonialism, in short, contributed to the thinning out of „religious‟ identities by 
encouraging identification on the basis of loosely defined yet mutually exclusive categories 
but did not „invent‟ the cosmological traditions on which they were based. For Kaviraj, 
religion is thick in the sense that its internal contents are a vast archive of ordered beliefs, 
some of which may appear trivial but are in fact crucial to the practice of a particular faith.
83
 
Crucially, these beliefs do not necessarily intrude on the political sphere but are more 
concerned with determining social conduct and ethical problems. These problems, however, 
may themselves become politicized if the state takes it upon itself to regulate the „inner 
domain‟ 84  of spiritual life without reference to traditional „religiosity‟. The religious 
community, though, is narrowly defined and limited to members of the immediate locality 
who satisfy the stringent criteria for membership, frequently segmented on caste and regional 
lines.   
„Thin‟ religion on the other hand appeals to the lowest common denominator among 
members of the same religious community. Religion is thin in the sense that the criteria for 
membership of the religious community are loosely defined and, thus, open to adherents of 
wildly divergent religious philosophies. All Hindus (or Sikhs or Muslims) can be included in 
a nationally defined and structured religious community irrespective of individual belief and 
faith. Indeed, „thin‟ religion is disinterested in the everyday practice of worship and regards 
regional and sectarian variations as impediments to the consolidation of the religious 
community. Finally, „thin‟ religion is intensely political in the sense that it seeks to mobilize 
the religious community for political ends and even to capture state power. As Kaviraj points 
out, the primary purpose of the inclusion of members of different religious communities (in a 
„thick‟ sense) in a loosely defined, nationally organized community is ironically to exclude 
other (loosely defined) religious communities from participating in the construction of a 
religiously plural common national culture. In short, this modern form of religious identity is 
fundamentally opposed to notions of traditional „religiosity‟: it is thin, not thick; political, not 
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ethical; intolerant, not accommodating; and interested in the political kingdom not in the life 
to come.
85
 In the following section, we will focus on the „thinning out‟ of Sikh identity 
following the encounter with colonial modernity. The processes associated with colonial 
governmentality simultaneously de-territorialized and re-territorialized a pre-existing Sikh 
identity by forcing it into the narratives of „nation‟ and „world religion.‟ 
 
Sikhi(sm) and Ontological Security 
 
Sikhi is a monotheistic (or strictly speaking panentheistic) cosmological tradition which 
originated in the Punjab area of North India, open to all those who are prepared to accept its 
doctrines and practices. Central to Sikhi is the concept of Vahiguru, the omnipotent and 
omnipresent transcendent creator and sovereign of the universe who lies beyond human 
understanding, time and space, and does not take human form. Although the tradition dates 
back to Guru Nanak (1469-1539) and the ten successive Gurus, Harjot Oberoi has 
persuasively argued that a cohesive Sikh religious identity arose in the late nineteenth century 
as a result of the activities of the Singh Sabha movement and their elucidation of a Tat 
Khalsa discourse which became hegemonic in the early years of the twentieth century. A 
„growing body of Sikhs took part in a systematic campaign to purge their faith of religious 
diversity…The result was a fundamental change in the nature of the Sikh tradition. From an 
amorphous entity it rapidly turned into a homogenous community.‟ 86  This appears to 
substantiate the view that colonial modernity contributed to a thinning out of pre-existing 
religio-political identities centred on the concept of Sikhi as embodied in the Khalsa. 
However, the institution of the Khalsa Panth by the tenth and last Guru, Gobind 
Singh (1666-1708) in 1699 gave Sikhs a cohesive Sikh religio-political identity before the 
onset of colonial rule and has remained an important source of ontological security ever 
since, providing Sikhs with a „protective cocoon‟ 87  which allows them to negotiate the 
challenges of life as a religious and national minority in both a South Asian and diaspora 
setting. Sikh identity as institutionalized in the Khalsa is, therefore, thick in Kaviraj‟s sense; 
its internal contents are a vast archive of ordered beliefs which crucially, are embodied. 
 The term Khalsa, derived from the Arabic khalis, literally means „pure‟ but implies 
spiritual purity and appears first in the Adi Granth (AG: 655). Guru Nanak (1469–1539) had 
earlier developed a religious and social philosophy which drew upon but was distinct from 
both Hinduism and Islam. For Nanak, there was „only one Lord, and only one tradition.‟ He 
conceived of the concept of God, Vahiguru („Wonderful Lord‟), as an omnipotent and 
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omnipresent transcendent creator and the only „true sovereign‟ (Sacha Patishah) of the 
world. Sikhism, thus, developed both a spiritual and temporal conception of „sovereignty‟ 
which was institutionalized through the construction of the Akal Takht, the „throne of the 
immortal Lord‟, facing Harimandir Sahib in Amritsar. Both „spiritual‟ and „temporal‟ 
sovereignty was invested in the personage of the Guru and symbolized by the two swords 
which were first worn by the sixth Guru, Hargobind; piri, signifying spiritual authority and 
miri, temporal authority. 
 Guru Gobind Singh, however, bestowed the spiritual dimensions (piri) of the Guru‟s 
authority on the Adi Granth (now the Guru Granth Sahib) which was housed in the 
Harimandir while, under the doctrine of Guru-Panth, investing all temporal authority (miri) in 
the Khalsa Panth, through the khande ki pahul. He sought to spiritually cleanse his 
community by giving his five volunteers amrit (sweetened water) stirred with the double-
edged sword, the khanda, thus conferring the spiritual and temporal authority of the Guru 
onto the Khalsa. For Gurbhagat Singh, the khande ki pahul was performed to 
„psychologically transform the common folk, make them Singhs (lions) and commit them to 
the new narrative that aimed at countering the symbolic violence of the two hegemonizing 
grand narratives‟ of Hinduism and Islam.88 By instituting the Khalsa, and then undergoing 
the initiation rite himself, Guru Gobind Singh acknowledged the (temporal) sovereignty of 
the Khalsa Panth and submitted himself to its collective will. Thereafter, the Khalsa was to 
be the site of all sovereignty for orthodox Sikhs by providing them with ontological security 
through the five external symbols of the Sikh „faith‟. Collectively known as the Five Ks, 
these are: kes, unshorn hair which is usually tied in a turban; a kanga, which performs the 
function of constraining the hair; a steel bangle (kara) worn over the right wrist; kacha, a pair 
of shorts; and finally a sword (kirpan), the symbol of the temporal sovereignty of the Khalsa.  
It is the very embodiment of Khalsa identity through the Five Ks that constitutes the 
political community of the Sikh „nation‟. In Jasbir Singh Ahluwalia‟s words, the 
institutionalization of the Khalsa was a „nationic transformation ushering in a „new socio-
political order . . . characterized by the values of equality, liberty and justice, without any 
discrimination on the grounds of creed, caste, country, race, sex and social position.‟ 89 
Wearing the Five Ks signified membership of the Sikh qaum or „nation,‟ thus transforming 
what Giorgio Agamben terms as „bare life‟90 into one endowed with dignity and meaning. It 
is the very embodiment of sovereignty in the Khalsa which poses „a challenge to the putative 
“incontestable” reality of the Indian nation-state‟s sovereignty and territoriality.‟91  
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 However, Sikh nationalist narratives territorialize the claims to sovereignty of the 
Khalsa Panth within the borders of the Punjab in the „imagined homeland‟ of Khalistan and 
therefore constitute a thinning down of the religio-political traditions associated with the 
Khalsa.  The „territorialized‟ challenge to the „incontestable‟ reality of the Indian nation-state 
posed by the movement for Khalistan disembodies the Khalsa Panth of the sovereignty 
invested in it by Guru Gobind. By internalizing Western narratives of the nation-state, the 
movement for Khalistan legitimizes the partition of the sub-continent along ethno-religious 
lines and the very territorialization of identity which underpins the Westphalian international 
order founded on the principle – first established at the Diet of Augsburg in 1555- of „cuius 
regio, eius religio.‟ Indeed, it is the very intertwining of the spiritual and temporal 
dimensions of Sikh sovereignty that posed such a challenge to the sovereignty of the Indian 
nation-state in 1984.
92
 In seeking to keep the domains of the „religious‟ and „political‟ 
separate, the primary institution of colonial modernity, the secular state, sought to exclude the 
„religious‟ from the public sphere. However, both spiritual and temporal dimensions of 
sovereignty were embodied in the Khalsa and territorialized in the Golden Temple complex 
in Amritsar which houses both Harmandir Sahib and the Akal Takht. This made the Golden 
Temple complex a „legitimate‟ target from the perspective of the Indian security forces and 
their British neo-colonial backers
93
 since it transrupted the project of colonial modernity 
upon which the legitimacy of the Indian state as successor to the Raj was founded. The Akal 
Takht in particular, as the site of Sikh temporal sovereignty, was considered a „security threat‟ 
which could only be dealt with through the state‟s assertion of its monopoly of violence. The 
damage to the structure was intended and not a mere by-product of the security forces desire 
to „flush the militants out‟ of the complex as claimed at the time. However, the same security 
forces were less successful in extending the sovereignty of the nation-state biopolitically over 
the Khalsa since Sikh sovereignty is embodied and therefore not subject to the state‟s 
monopoly of force which is territorially defined.   
Sikh nationalism, therefore, can provide only a „thin‟ understanding of ontological 
security, one based on a politics of identity which reproduces the „friend-enemy‟ dichotomy 
in contrast with a „thicker‟ embodied conception of ontological security as represented by the 
Khalsa which attempts to transcend the „self-other‟ dichotomy through the concept of 
Vahiguru. In so doing, it may be considered a Sikh concept of human security. 
 
Conclusion: From Ontological Security to Cosmological Securities? 
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In contrast with some attempts to apply the concept of ontological security to IR  by „scaling 
up‟ the level of analysis from the individual to that of the state94, this article has sought to 
confine the discussion on ontological security to the level of the individual, thus allowing a 
contrast to be made with conventional understandings of Human Security. It was argued that 
the concept of Human Security has been unable to distance itself from hegemonic 
understandings of security as articulated through the „national security‟ paradigm since it 
continues to place emphasis upon the physical security of the individual which can only be 
guaranteed by an effectively functioning state in a world of territorialized nation-states. The 
individual is to be secured from „fear and want‟ and empowered to make decisions on her/his 
own behalf by the state and an „enlightened‟ international community. Consequently, 
parallels can be drawn with the „civilizing mission‟ of nineteenth century colonialism.  
Crucially, the ontological dimensions of security are occluded in conventional 
accounts of Human Security. The individual, „stripped‟ of the social bonds of language, 
culture and religion which bind individuals to each other is reduced to „bare life‟95. However, 
post-secular conceptions of Human Security, by acknowledging the role which culture and 
religion in a thick sense, can play in providing answers to existential questions concerning the 
„basic parameters of human life‟ - namely, existence and being, finitude and human life, the 
experience of others and the continuity of self-identity
96– are better able to „protect‟ the 
ontological security of the individual. A post-secular conception of human security, therefore, 
can act as a form of ontological security without recourse to the „friend-enemy‟97 dichotomy 
of other quests for ontological security as represented by nationalism and much of IR theory.  
However, the colonial legacy continues to cast a shadow on the search for ontological 
security in the postcolonial world, as was briefly discussed with reference to South Asia and 
Sikhism in particular. It was argued that Sikh nationalism represented a thinning out of Sikh 
identity and that discourses of Sikhism as a „world religion‟ effectively de-politicized Sikh 
identity and claims to sovereignty as embodied in the Khalsa. As a thick form of religiosity 
and cultural identity, the Khalsa can provide Sikhs in South Asia and the Diaspora with a 
sense of ontological and human security in a rapidly and unevenly globalizing world 
characterized by great disparities not only in wealth and power but also „security‟. In 
conclusion, although this article has not succeeded in liberating „the cultures/histories‟ of 
post-colonial peoples such as the Sikhs from the shadow of‟ “alterity,” from the consolations 
of “difference,” from the language of “otherness,”‟ 98  it has at least attempted to 
„provincialize‟99 secular understandings of security- both human and ontological- and open 
up the possibility of speaking of cosmological securities in the plural.  
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